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Charlotte's Equity Loan Program: A Model
for Financing Inner-City Redevelopment
This article reviews equity loan programs for inner city neighborhoods in Charlotte and
Greensboro, North Carolina. The author explains the needfor capital in inner cities, then discusses
the role of lending in neighborhood development. Three similar programs - Phoenix's collateral
development program, the U.S. Housing and Urban Development Administration's New Markets
Initiative, and the Corporation for Enterprise Development's Individual Development Accounts -
are overviewed and compared with Charlotte's City Within A City equity program. The author
conducts three analyses: 1) an outcome or performance-based analysis, 2) a process analysis of
activity interest, and 3) an impact analysis that examines qualitative effects of two business on
their respective neighborhoods. Early results suggest that the CWACprogram has been successful,
although some structural features limit the program 's effectiveness. Self Help has sought to
replicate the success of this program in Greensboro. The author provides a set ofrecommendations
for beginning such a program in Greensboro and other North Carolina cities.
Anne Scorza
/. Introduction
Many urban business districts across the
United States have suffered over the years from
neglect, out-migration of residents and businesses,
racial and ethnic discrimination, and public policy
favoring suburban development. As a result, these
once-thriving commercial and shopping districts,
which together with surrounding residential
neighborhoods are known as the "'inner city," are
now home to vacant or boarded-up buildings, high
crime rates, inadequate infrastructure, and
struggling businesses. Residents and employees
in these neighborhoods do not have access to the
goods and services they need, and are thus forced
to spend money elsewhere, either in the suburbs
or in the city's more prosperous business districts.
A number of policies and programs have been
developed to address these problems. In 1999, the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) established the New Markets
Initiative, designed to stimulate business
development in inner cities, which the initiative
views as overlooked "new markets" with untapped
retail and business potential.' Community
Development Block Grants, Enterprise
Communities and Empowerment Zones, the
Community Development Financial Institution
(CDFI) Fund, and the Brownfields Economic
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Development Initiative are other federal programs
that target investment in these areas. In fiscal year
1996. Federal spending on urban economic
development programs for the inner city was
approximately $8.9 billion. 2 In 1 999, this figure rose
to $9 billion. 1 At the state level, state development
zones and statewide growth management tools
(such as urban growth boundaries) target
development by location, environmental features,
and socio-economic characteristics.
At the local level, many cities and towns have
used tools such as tax-increment financing (TIF)
districts, business improvement districts, facade
grant funds, and local development zones to meet
the needs of their distressed business districts. The
City of Chicago, for example, has established over
100 TIF districts, where roads and other
infrastructure have been improved, vacant buildings
have been rehabbed, and jobs have been created.
TIF is a method by which property tax revenue
generated from redevelopment is captured and
retained for additional redevelopment within the
district. TIF can be an effective way to target
redevelopment of blighted neighborhoods without
diverting the City's general funds from other
projects.4 (North Carolina's constitution does not
permit the use of TIF programs.)
Likewise, local business owners often use
business improvement districts (BIDs) to clean up
and provide services to their districts. Under this
method, property owners voluntarily agree to pay
for common services in the district, usually through
taxation. For example, a BID was established in
1992 in Times Square, long known as one of New
York City's red-light districts. The Times Square
BID succeeded in using its $7 million annual
appropriations, culled from grants, resident dues
and commercial building tax assessments, to
complete its goal of making the area "clean, safe
and friendly," though some have criticized this
program for ruining Times Square's character. 5
Finally, booster groups at all levels of government,
through Chambers of Commerce and non-profit
organizations, have also formed to promote
distressed business district revitalization.
Loan programs are another tool used at the
Federal, state and local levels to finance business
district development. Governments, non-profit
organizations, and private developers often must
rely on outside financing to undertake revitalization
projects. Likewise, individuals rely on financing
tools to start or expand small businesses. For both
organizations and individuals, when existing assets
are insufficient to fund the project, debt financing
is used as a means to leverage existing assets and
acquire the necessary remaining funds. Where
the gap in existing and needed assets is high, often
in inner-city neighborhoods, targeted loan programs
can be an effective way to fill the gap and encourage
individuals to start or expand businesses. However,
a greater challenge exists when equity funds are
unavailable. In that case, nothing exists to leverage
debt dollars, so it is more difficult to obtain the
required debt financing. For many low-wealth
individuals seeking to start businesses, it is this lack
of equity that hinders their ability to obtain loans.
The City of Charlotte established the City
Within A City (CWAC) Equity Loan Program to
address this need for equity. By providing deferred
equity loans to eligible individuals, the program aims
to close the gap between existing and needed assets
and thereby stimulate small business start-up and
expansion in targeted distressed neighborhoods.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the
success of this program and to make
recommendations for replicating it in other North
Carolina cities. Self-Help, a non-profit credit union
and CDFI based in Durham, has been an active
lender with the Charlotte program since 1995.
Recognizing the program's potential to address the
need for entrepreneurial capital in other cities
throughout the state. Self-Help has taken the lead
in a replication effort currently underway in
Greensboro. The replication effort in Greensboro
and the program's experience in Charlotte form
the basis of my recommendations.
Before turning to Charlotte's program and the
replication effort, I first explain the need for capital
in inner cities, then discuss the role of lending in
neighborhood development, and finally briefly
discuss three other programs similarly designed to
address the need for capital. In Section II, I
describe and analyze the Charlotte program as a
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case study. The final section of this paper outlines
Self-Help's replication effort and its proposed
program for Greensboro, and concludes with
recommendations for a successful equity loan
program.
The Need for Equity Capital in Inner Cities
Many inner cities across the United States
suffer from physical, social and economic distress.
Physically, their streets, water/sewer systems, and
other infrastructure are often crumbling and
outdated. Socially, inner cities have higher crime
rates, less educated residents, and a lower skilled
workforce than other parts of metro areas. And
economically, inner cities have less wealth, less
entrepreneurial activity, and less access to capital
compared to their suburbs. To contrast these traits
with the potential economic advantages of these
neighborhoods - such as location and untapped
market demand - Harvard Business School
Professor Michael Porter identifies these traits as
the "real disadvantages of the inner city. 6
"
The focus of this paper is on the last trait:
access to capital. According to Porter, "access to
debt and equity capital represents a formidable
barrier to entrepreneurship and company growth
in inner city areas. 7" Hard evidence to support
this claim is difficult to find, though some studies
do exist. For example, a study of small companies
(less than $1 million in annual sales) in the Chicago
metropolitan area found that the number of loans
to these firms was expected to decrease in census
tracts with more blacks or Hispanics and/or with
lower income levels. This study, though unable to
definitively prove racial or geographic lending
discrimination, does show that businesses in lower-
income and minority neighborhoods receive fewer
loans than those in higher-income and white
neighborhoods, controlling for firm size, industry
type and firm population. The study also cites
research showing that smaller, newer firms are less
likely to receive loans than larger, older firms (Cole
1988); black-owned firms are denied loans more
often than white-owned firms (Ando 1988); and
start-up firms in minority areas receive smaller
loans than similar firms in non-minority
neighborhoods (Bates 1989, 1993) s . Finally, a
survey by the Initiative for a Competitive Inner
City (IOC) of 40 inner-city businesses in Boston
revealed that approximately 60 percent of the
business owners reported having difficulty
accessing debt and equity capital at the time of the
study.
Anecdotal evidence for the lack of access to
credit is more prevalent. The Charlotte equity loan
program began because of lenders' observations
that access to equity was a significant barrier to
loan approvals. City staff agreed that equity was
needed, and the City Council approved the
program. Throughout Self-Help's effort to
replicate this program, economic developers. City
leaders, downtown booster groups, and loan
officers in Durham, Charlotte and Wilmington have
also pointed to equity capital as the missing piece
among many potential borrowers. For example,
an informal review of 75 loan applications to Self-
Help's Durham office revealed that six denied loans
- nearly 10 percent - would have been approved
had equity capital been available. In one case, the
loan officer had to deny a loan to an individual
seeking to start an ambulance service because "he
had weak credit but the real obstacle was that he
had no free cash to put into the deal. 9" While the
number of denials may not be large, these six cases
show that even for a flexible lender such as Self-
Help. lack of equity can be a significant barrier.
Furthermore, many potential borrowers are
screened out before they reach the application
stage, suggesting" that an even greater number of
individuals do not receive loans because of lack of
equity.
There are many explanations for this inability
among minority and inner-city firms to access
capital. First, discrimination among lenders
prevents many minority small business owners from
obtaining loans. It is believed that many private
lenders practice statistical discrimination, whereby
loans to minority applicants are rejected based on
historically higher default rates. 10 Second, small
loans to entrepreneurs in any environment are less
profitable than larger loans, because transaction
costs are the same regardless of loan size, while
lower interest and fee revenue on smaller loans
yields less profit. Lenders therefore prefer to make
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larger loans, putting small business owners in the
inner city and elsewhere at a disadvantage.
Third, according to Porter, "inner city
entrepreneurs often lack personal or family savings
and networks of individuals to draw on for
capital."" To the extent that Porter's definition
of the inner city includes a large proportion of blacks
and other racial minorities, this argument can be
supported by evidence that whites have higher net
worth and net financial assets than other races. 12
For example, Sherraden ( 1 99 1 ) demonstrates that
in 1984, the median net worth of whites was as
much as 95 times higher than that of blacks and
Hispanics." Oliver and Shapiro ( 1997) likewise
show that in 1988, the median net worth - all assets
less any debts - of whites was approximately
twelve times higher than that of blacks ($43,800
versus $3,700). u Finally, a The Wall Street Journal
reported in 2000 that white non-Hispanics had
approximately six times the family net worth of
nonwhites and Hispanics ($94,900 versus
$1 6,400). 15 Whatever the level of disparity, the
fact is that nonwhites have significantly less net
worth than whites.
Similarly, we can consider net financial assets
(NFA) - defined as liquid financial assets that are
available for present or future conversion into cash
- as another measure of wealth. Oliver and Shapiro
find that the disparity in NFA between blacks and
whites is even more pronounced than the disparity
in net worth: the median NFA of whites is $6,999,
while the median NFA for blacks is $0. As
expected, this disparity is most pronounced among
individuals with less income, education and work
experience, and among people younger than age
36 or over age 64. I6
Less extensive networks of wealthy families
or friends also prohibit access to capital among
inner-city minorities. Long-time institutional policies
have prevented minorities, particularly blacks, from
accumulating wealth. Starting with slavery and
continuing through reconstruction, Jim Crow
segregation, the Federal Housing Act of 1934,
urban renewal in the 1960s, and predatory lending
today, the financial inequality between whites and
minorities has been passed down from generation
to generation. Combined with social and other
economic inequalities, such as unequal access to
education and jobs, the result is that blacks and
other minorities have historically had less access
to social and financial capital than whites.
Therefore, there is less available capital among
social networks of minorities than of whites, and
minorities, on average, cannot rely on friends or
family for capital assistance. 17
Fourth, Porter argues that "institutional sources
of equity capital are scarce for minority-owned
companies and have virtually ignored inner city
business opportunities." According to Forbes
Magazine, venture capitalists invested $85 billion
in developing companies in 1 998, but only $2 billion,
or 2.3 percent, went to minority-owned
companies. 18 Federal government programs
leveraged a similar amount of capital for inner-city
businesses. IOC found that in 1996, the Federal
government's $300 million in direct inner-city capital
expenditures (primarily in the form of credit
enhancement programs) leveraged $2.5 billion in
private capital. However, the government spent
twice as much ($600 million) on all urban lending
programs, which leveraged four times the amount
of private capital ($11 billion) as that invested in
inner cities. 19 Compared to white-owned
businesses and companies located in more
prosperous urban areas, then, inner-city businesses
receive significantly less equity capital investments.
Charlotte's CWAC Equity Loan Program was
designed to address these shortcomings.
Recognizing the specific need for assistance with
the equity portion of a project, the loan program's
creators sought to help inner-city entrepreneurs
overcome one barrier to small business
development. The program was not intended to
address the other barriers, such as low credit
scores or insufficient business management
capability. The City has developed other programs
such as the Business and Entrepreneurial Skills
Training Program, a partnership with Central
Piedmont Community College and First Citizens
Bank, to help small businesses address some of
these issues. Nonetheless, the CWAC program's
creation and success attest to the need for equity
capital among Charlotte's inner-city businesses.
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The Role of Lenders in Neighborhood
Development
It is widely recognized lenders play a critical
role in neighborhood development and operate in
the context of large social, economic, and political
forces. The pattern ofhome mortgage lending over
time clearly demonstrates the interaction of these
forces. For example. Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration
(VA) loan programs, which created 30-year, fully
amortizing, low monthly payment, and 10 percent
down payment loans, produced an explosion of
home ownership in the United States after World
War II. These programs (along with increased
home construction and advances in transportation
and electric power) also produced a tremendous
rise in suburban development. However, another
consequence of the FHA and VA loan programs
was increased racial segregation between suburbs
and cities. The practice of redlining - denying loans
to racially-diverse, low-income, high-poverty
neighborhoods - which was instituted under the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) during
the 1930s, continued under the FHA and VA
programs, and was quickly adopted by private
banks. The programs also instituted racially
restrictive covenants until 1950. As a result of
these policies, white suburban home ownership
flourished, while blacks and other minorities were
increasingly isolated in urban enclaves where
property values fell, and lack of investment led to
disrepair, vacancy, and abandonment. 20
Recognizing the ability of loan programs to
shape the character of neighborhoods, policy
makers can help develop policies and programs to
prevent future segregation and dislocation of
residents, and produce more economically
sustainable neighborhoods. The Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 is one such
policy. This act requires lenders to serve the
neighborhoods from which their deposits come, in
order to improve low-wealth communities' access
to credit. To enforce this law. the act requires
periodic reviews and requires that Federal
regulators consider lending activity to low-income
and minority residents when reviewing applications
for mergers and acquisitions. Through these
reviews. Federal regulators assess lenders' CRA
activity and assign them one of four ranks
(Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, and
Substantial Noncompliance). 21
In response to this act and to challenges from
community advocacy groups, particularly when
banks have sought approval of proposed mergers,
banks and other lenders have created CRA
agreements and have increased their efforts to
target loans to inner-city and other distressed
neighborhoods. In the commercial lending realm,
CRA agreements can include provisions for lenders
to target small businesses, minority- and women-
owned businesses, and economic development
projects. Despite the serious threat that increased
lending to minority and low-income neighborhoods
has the potential to inadvertently encourage
predatory lending, the Community Reinvestment
Act has raised awareness across the country of
the important role that lenders play in community
development.
One final example further illustrates the role
of lenders in neighborhood development. In July
2000. the Forest Conservation Council (FCC) and
Friends of the Earth (FoE) issued a joint letter to
four regional Small Business Administration (SBA)
offices warning that the SBAs lending activity was
contributing to urban sprawl. As a Federal agency,
the SBA is responsible under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to assess the
environmental impacts of its actions. According
to the letter, FCC and FoE requested that the SBA
"prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement which discloses the cumulative effects
of its lending and loan guarantee programs in the
Greater Washington D.C. area. ..since these
programs significantly contribute to problems of
urban sprawl. 22" In October. FCC and FoE
followed up on their accusation with a lawsuit
against the SBA. In response, the national Black
Chamber of Commerce Filed an amicus brief in
support of the SBA. In a similar move, the Small
Business Survival Committee (an advocacy group)
followed with a counterattack on FCC and FoE.
defending the SBA's loan programs as essential to
successful entrepreneurship. 21












lending policies can affect neighborhoods and
larger-scale urban spatial patterns. Regardless of
the outcome of the lawsuit filed against the SBA,
this case demonstrates that lending institutions
should be aware of the potential impacts of their
lending activity on neighborhoods.
The designers of Charlotte's City Within A City
loan program recognize the program's potential for
neighborhood- and city-level impact. By lending
in specific geographic areas, in conjunction with
the otherCWAC initiatives, the equity loan program
focuses its efforts on sustainable development of
inner-city neighborhoods. To the extent that loans
go to businesses in the CWAC targeted area, the
program reduces the pressures for urban sprawl.
Before turning to this program, I first briefly present
three other programs that also address community
development and the need for equity capital.
What Others Have Done: Sample Programs
Somewhat surprisingly, there appears to be no
other program in the country like the CWAC Equity
Loan Program. Many local governments offer low-
interest loan programs to stimulate development
of targeted communities, but none offers loans
deferred up to ten years to small business owners
lacking cash for a down payment. The City of
Phoenix has a program that is very similar to
CWAC, but provides funds for collateral rather than
equity. Two other programs addressing the same
problem - lack of capital among inner-city business
owners - are the New Markets Initiative and
Individual Development Accounts. In the following
section, I describe these programs, compare them
to the CWAC program, and discuss their strengths
and weaknesses.
to business owners lacking adequate collateral
to obtain conventional loans. 24
Under the program, loan applicants who
demonstrate all elements necessary to obtain
conventional financing except for adequate
collateral may apply to the City for a "collateral
enhancement." If approved, the City pledges a
Certificate of Deposit (CD) to a participating lender
in the amount of 25 percent of the loan (maximum),
to a dollar ceiling of $ 1 00.000. This CD then serves
as collateral for the loan; if the loan goes into default
and liquidation, the lender may claim the
enhancement funds. However, if the loan is repaid,
the enhancement collateral is returned to the
program for future commitments. As the loan is
paid off. the amount of the collateral enhancement
is periodically reduced so that it always equals a
constant percentage of the loan amount. These
funds - and the interest accrued on them while
deposited with the financial institution - are then
recycled back into the program.
The EXPAND program is a unique, simple,
and effective program to help small businesses
obtain loans. From 1993 to 2000, it provided more
than $3 million in collateral enhancements to
approximately 70 businesses, enabling companies
to borrow over $ 1 2 million in private funds. On
average, the program commits approximately
$45,000 in collateral to each business. Since 1993.
four projects have defaulted, totaling $97,250, or 3
percent of total funds pledged. Over the program's
seven years, this represents an annual loss rate of
less than 0.05 percent, similar to lending industry
standards. More than 500 jobs have been created
and maintained as a result of the program, the
program reports.
City of Phoenix EXPAND Program
The City of Phoenix established the
Expansion Assistance and Development
Program (EXPAND) to stimulate access to
capital for small and medium-sized businesses.
Where the CWAC Equity Loan Program
addresses the need for equity capital, the
EXPAND program provides financial assistance
The City recognizes the benefits this program
creates for the small businesses, citizens and the
City as a whole. Business start-up and expansion,
increased goods and services, and job creation are
among the program's advantages. Lenders are
able to make more loans as a result of the program,
thereby increasing profits. The City also benefits
from a larger tax base resulting from increased
business activity and jobs. The program's
popularity among lenders (16 lenders have used
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the program since its inception. 1 1 from 1989 to
1999) also attests to its success. In addition, the
revolving feature of the program makes it self-
sustaining. In fiscal year 1998-99, more than two
thirds (69 percent) of the program's funds were
recycled from previous collateral contributions and
earned interest. (One major shortcoming of the
CWAC program is its failure to be self-sustaining,
as I discuss later in this paper.)
Challenges and limitations to the program
include its reliance on CDBG funds, its broad
applicant pool, and its untargeted geography.
First, while the majority of the program's funds
come from its own activity, the City may have
difficulty procuring CDBG funds annually due
to competition for the funds. Second, by not
establishing eligibility requirements, the program
does not target assistance to those most in need.
Third, by allowing loans to businesses anywhere
in the city, the program limits its potential to
concentrate investment in targeted, distressed
areas. However, loans have in fact clustered in
City Council District 8 (central Phoenix) due
perhaps to a greater need in that area. In
addition, the program's unrestricted geography
likely increases political support for the program.
EXPAND has been able to successfully balance
the need for city-wide political support with the
needs of specific neighborhoods, which is crucial
for any local government seeking to establish a
geographically-targeted program.
New Markets Initiative
Another program similar to Charlotte's CWAC
Equity Loan Program is the New Markets Initiative.
NMI is a Federal program launched by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) in 1999 to stimulate investment in America's
low-income urban and rural communities. Today,
the literature surrounding the initiative focuses on
urban communities with a retail gap - where retail
buying power exceeds retail sales - that are viewed
as overlooked "new markets" with untapped retail
and business potential. 25 This concept stems from
the research of Porter and ICIC, discussed above,
which contends that inner cities have strategic
economic advantages over other locations.
The original concept for NMI included seven
programs designed to provide technical assistance
and capital to the inner city, to create a network of
investors, and to increase awareness of the
economic potential of inner-city businesses. One
program that has received federal funding is the
New Markets Tax Credit. This program was
enacted in December 2000 and aims to stimulate
$15 billion of investment in low-income
communities. This program enables qualified
community development entities (CDEs) to sell tax
credits to investors in exchange for equity capital
which the CDEs provide to businesses in qualified
low-income areas. Investors receive a tax credit
of 5 percent of the investment for the first three
years, and 6 percent for the next four years (totaling
39 percent over seven years), plus a portion of the
returns generated from the investment. Qualified
low-income communities are defined as census
tracts with a 20 percent or higher poverty rate, or
with a median family income below 80 percent of
the area median income. Businesses receiving
capital investments from CDEs must be located
in. provide substantial services to, or earn at least
50 percent of gross income from these low-income
communities. 26
NMI. and the tax credit program in
particular, address the same problem identified
by the CWAC program: inadequate capital in
distressed urban business districts. Both
programs increase the opportunity for businesses
in low-income communities to receive loans.
Both programs also recognize the potential for
inner-city communities to become successful
markets for jobs, goods and services, and
increased investment. Finally. CWAC and NMI
both seek to capitalize on inner-city
neighborhoods' competitive advantages in
regards to location, infrastructure, and labor
force.
The New Markets Initiative's strength lies in
its recognition of the potential of inner cities, and in
its ability to provide information to the public and
to investors about this potential. Its involvement
of the private sector, through a popular vehicle such
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as the tax credit, is another strength.
There are also potential weaknesses and
unintended consequences of the initiative and the
tax credit program. Most important, the tax credit
program runs the risk of causing relocation of
neighborhood residents. 27 By enabling non-local
businesses to locate in inner cities and qualify for
capital investments, and by not requiring employees
of these businesses to reside in low-income
communities, the program may inadvertently
provide more capital to outsiders than to the existing
community residents. Also, the program may
simply encourage businesses to locate in targeted
neighborhoods instead of other areas of the city
that may be in need of business development. In
this case, business location is diverted from one
neighborhood to another, and the city does not
necessarily gain a net benefit. Finally, the NMI
literature's focus on retail runs counter to the
recognition of the jobs multiplier effect, whereby
manufacturing and industrial activity create more
jobs than retail businesses. In the case of the tax
credit program, where the types of businesses that
receive loans and investment will be determined
by the CDEs, it will be up to the CDEs to ensure
investment in non-retail companies. A provision
encouraging CDEs to do this would make sense,
such as the provision in the CWAC program that
increases the allowable loan amount to
manufacturing businesses.
Individual Development Accounts
In 1997. the Corporation for Enterprise
Development initiated its American Dream
Demonstration program to test how well Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs) can help low-
income and low-asset individuals save and build
wealth through the ownership of a home or business,
or through investments in post-secondary education
or retirement accounts. Michael Sherraden
developed the IDA concept, published in hisAsreW
and the Poor ( 1990). as a means of restructuring
the American welfare system. Today, 14
demonstration projects run by 13 organizations exist
throughout the country to test the concept. :s The
CWAC equity loan program is comparable to the
self-employment version of the IDA: both are
designed to help individuals overcome the difficulty
of saving enough cash for a down payment to start
or expand a business.
Typically, an IDA serves as a matching fund
whereby every dollar an individual deposits is
matched two to one by program dollars. This is
the case in North Carolina, for example, where
funds are typically capped at $ 1 ,000 and matched
two to one, according to a study by the University
of North Carolina's Center for Urban and Regional
Studies (CURS). When an individual contributes
the maximum amount, the program matches it with
$2,000, allowing each participant to build up to
$3,000 in savings. 29
The IDA concept is an innovative approach to
asset building. By encouraging future-oriented
saving behavior, and by limiting the use of funds to
specific realms, IDAs address the need for long-
term, targeted investment. Sherraden
demonstrates that IDAs will benefit not just the
recipients at the micro level, but also the nation at
the macro level by encouraging economic growth
through capital accumulation. What is less
apparent, however, is whether IDAs will be a
benefit at the neighborhood or community level.
In neighborhoods where demonstration projects are
underway, will residents have increased access to
goods and services as a result of increased capital
accumulation? Requirements such as the one in
Durham that requires IDA participants to use their
savings to purchase a home within certain
geographic boundaries are encouraging in this
regard.
Among the 14 demonstration programs, more
account holders intend to use their funds for home
equity than for small business development. On
average, 55 percent of the programs' participants
are saving for home purchase, while only 1 8 percent
are saving for microenterprises. according to a
study by Washington University in St. Louis.
However, as of June 1999. 33 percent of account
holders who made withdrawals used their funds
for micorenterprise. outnumbering the 27 percent
of account holders who used their withdrawals for
home purchase. The Washington University study
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concludes that "early withdrawals for
micorenterprise are common because small sums
may be used for small businesses, whereas larger
amounts are usually required for home purchases."
Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the IDA program
has enabled over 1,000 individuals to accumulate
savings averaging $100 per month." 1
Summary
Entrepreneurs in many urban business districts
in the United States lack access to equity capital.
While national programs have been established to
address this shortcoming, such as the New Markets
Initiative and the IDA demonstration project, very
few local programs exist. In targeting inner cities,
these national programs shape the way lenders and
investors influence specific neighborhoods, and they
recognize that lending activity can profoundly affect
a neighborhood physically, socially, and
economically. Phoenix's collateral enhancement
program and the CWAC Equity Loan Program are
two local programs that address these same issues.
I now turn to Section II, where I describe the
CWAC program and the citywide CWAC initiative,
and assess the program's effectiveness.
//. Case Study: The Charlotte Model
The City Within A City Initiative
In 1991, leaders among the Charlotte City
Council recognized that the city's older urban
neighborhoods and business districts were in need
of specific, targeted revitalization efforts.
Responding to this need, the City formed City Within
A City (CWAC), a comprehensive strategy to
create a healthy urban core by addressing
economic development and quality of life issues in
the inner city. Mirroring Charlotte's local
development zones, the CWAC area encompasses
60 square miles surrounding the city's downtown,
and includes 73 neighborhoods. Compared to the
rest of the city, which includes approximately 1 00
neighborhoods covering 240 square miles, the
CWAC area's unemployment rate is currently five
times higher, its violent crime rate is twice as high,
and its juvenile crime rate is 30 percent higher.
The CWAC area also has high poverty, low
educational attainment levels, deteriorating and
relocating businesses, low quality housing, and low
levels of neighborhood involvement and
organizational capacity."
Today, the CWAC initiative is one of five focus
areas the City Council has identified to help meet
the community's needs; the others are Community
Safety, Transportation, Economic Development and
Restructuring Government. The specific goals of
the CWAC initiative are to improve the economic
opportunity, physical environment, and safety of
the CWAC area. To accomplish this, the initiative
has attempted to apply the principles of
empowerment, sustainability, capacity building, and
creating a sense of accountability among
community members. Establishing partnerships
between the City and community leaders is another
important element of the initiative's mission. As
such, the initiative is a comprehensive, participatory
approach to neighborhood revitalization.
In order to focus its efforts on the most
distressed neighborhoods within the CWAC area,
the City set priorities based on income, age.
education, and crime data. Later, to more
accurately identify the neediest neighborhoods, the
City hired the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte's Urban Institute to conduct a
comprehensive Quality of Life Study. This study
identified 20 variables, shown in Table 1, which
were combined by formula into a Quality of Life
Index. Weights for the formula are also shown in
Table 1 . The Quality of Life Index was then used
to identify each neighborhood statistical area
(NSA) as "stable," "threatened," or "fragile. 32"
Quality of Life Study Results
The Urban Institute conducted two Quality of
Life Studies, one in 1997 and one in 2000. The
first study examined only the 73 NSAs within the
CWAC boundaries, and used only 18 of the 20
variables. The second study expanded the
geographical focus to include 100 NSAs within the
Charlotte metro area but outside of CWAC, and
used all 20 variables. To account for differences
in study areas, and to allow for a more reliable
comparison between the 1997 and 2000 studies.
53
the Urban Institute conducted an additional study
in 2000 of only the 73 CWAC neighborhoods. It is
important to note, however, that because of the
change in variables, a direct comparison of the two
studies is impossible. Nonetheless, the Urban
Institute is able to conclude that "the strategic shift
[from 24 to 30] stable neighborhoods supports the
conclusion that CWAC neighborhoods are making
substantial strides in community quality of life. 33"
The results of the studies are shown in Table 2.
In 2000, the fragile neighborhoods formed a
semi-circle radiating northeast, northwest, and
southwest from the city's core. Threatened
neighborhoods extended out from these fragile
neighborhoods, and stable areas encompassed most
of the study area's outermost rings and the majority
of the southeastern corner. The three downtown
neighborhoods (First, Third and Fourth Wards) were
also ranked as stable. These results typify the
pattern of many central cities: a healthy downtown
ringed by highly distressed - or fragile -
neighborhoods, which in turn are surrounded by
healthier, more stable areas.
The CWAC initiative demonstrates Charlotte's
commitment to improving the social, physical, and
economic well being of its urban core. Its emphasis
on community involvement and empowerment is
admirable, as is its dedication to tracking
neighborhood changes over time through the
Quality of Life Studies. The City Council's
strategic plan for the initiative is well documented
with objectives and measurable benchmarks. For
example, under the "business district revitalization"
objective, the Council set goals such as "approval
of Westover Shopping Center Development" and
"Creation ofeconomic development plans for three
CWAC retail developments. 34" However, the
Quality of Life Study is not yet sufficient to evaluate
the initiative's success. With future studies, it will
be possible to compare results over time, and it
will be more apparent whether the program is
succeeding in its attempt to increase the number
of stable neighborhoods.
The CWAC Equity Loan Program:
Description
The CWAC Equity Loan Program is one of
several programs specifically designed to meet the
needs of the CWAC area. It is managed by the
Economic Dimension (10%) Physical Dimension (30%)
Change in Income (%) Appearance Index
Social Dimension (30%) Substandard Housing (%)
Persons Receiving Food Stamps (%) Homeowners (%)
Persons over Age 64 (%) Projected Infrastructure Improvement Costs
Average Kindergarten Score Persons with Access to Public Transportation (%)
Dropout Rate Persons with Access to Basic Retail (%)
Children Passing Competency Exams (%) Pedestrian Friendliness Index
Births to Adolescents (%) Crime Dimension (30%)
Youth Opportunity Index Violent Crime Rate
Number of Neighborhood Organizations Juvenile Crime Rate
Source: Charlotte Neighborhood Quality ofLife Study. Property Crime Rate
Table 1. UNC-Charlotte Urban Institute. July 2000. Crime Hot Spots





Inside CWAC 24 34
2000:
Inside CWAC 30 32
2000:








Source: Charlotte Neighborhood Quality of Life Study. UNC-Charlotte Urban Institute. July 2000.
Table 2: Neighborhood Ranking Results. 1997 and 2000 Quality of Life Studies
Business Services Officer in the City of Charlotte's
Neighborhood Development Department. The
program is one of the City's ten business financial
assistance programs.
The seeds for the equity loan program were
sown in August 1990 when Mayor Sue Myrick
established the West Side Economic Development
Task Force to help promote small businesses on
the city's west side. Meeting with local lenders in
November 1 990. the Task Force and local banks
recognized that lack of capital/equity was
preventing inner-city entrepreneurs from obtaining
traditional loans. To meet this need, the City of
Charlotte's Community Development Department
established the CWAC Equity Loan Program, and
expanded its geography from the West Side to
include the entire 60-square mile area covered by
the CWAC initiative. The City Council approved
the program in October 1991, appropriating $1.3
million in City funds from a former Urban
Development Action Grant. Eight banks pledged
$6.5 million in additional funds. The program began
operations on January 1, 1992.
Initially, the City described the program as one
designed to create jobs, primarily for low- and
moderate-income individuals. Today, the program
has four goals:
• To stimulate small business
investments in targeted areas.
• To provide low-wealth people
access to capital for business start-
ups and expansions.
• To create new service and retail
businesses to support targeted
neighborhoods.
• To create jobs for low- to moderate-
income people living in CWAC.
The combination of these four goals is key to
the program; the first three focus on neighborhood
and entrepreneurial development, while the last
emphasizes the expansion of opportunities for
others in the area. Together, they seek to address
the needs of residents, business owners, and other
members of these distressed communities.
How the Program Works
Under the program, the City loans the borrower
the equity portion of a loan (up to 20 percent of the
total loan), and a participating bank provides the
remaining 80 percent. The City loan is deferred,
with no interest, for a maximum of 10 years, after
which interest begins to accrue and repayments
begin. Given the time value of money, the zero
percent deferment period essentially renders the
loan a grant. While the City eventually recoups its
money, it forgoes the interest that it would have
earned during the deferment period.
When possible, borrowers are expected to
commit any available equity funds to the project.
For example, if the total project costs for
Business A were estimated at $105,000. and the
business owner chose to borrow $ 1 00.000, then
a bank would commit 80 percent of the total
loan ($80,000). and the City would commit 20
percent ($20,000). The business owner would
pay the remaining $5,000 in personal equity.
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Regardless of the dollar amount, the key point • For every $10,000 of City funds
is that the maximum allowable City contribution borrowed, the business must create one
is 20 percent of the total financed portion of the job for low- or moderate-income people
project. However, because the program is based living in the CWAC area.
on the recognition that equity is often unavailable. • Loans exceeding $50,000 must be
there is no minimum equity requirement, meaning approved by the City Manager or
that a business owner could finance 100 percent designee; loans over $ 1 00,000 must be
of the project's costs. Despite this provision. approved by the City Council.
the City and lender typically request a minimum • Loans involving the acquisition of real
equity contribution of five percent. estate must demonstrate that the
acquisition is required for the viability of
The terms of the loans (as of January 2001
)




• Banks approve or deny loan applications
• The minimum total loan amount is using standard underwriting criteria. In
^
$15,000. the event that the equity cash is
o
unavailable, and is the only thing
-J
-J Citv Loan
preventing an applicant from obtaining
5 the loan, the bank issues its loan
commitment letter with a contingency
-j
1
• The City loan is subordinated to the bank that the City will provide the additional
loan. The City loan repayment is equity needed in the form of a deferred
O deferred for five years, with the option loan. This is then forwarded to the City,
CD
2 to renew up to an additional five years if along with the borrower's personal
2
2 the borrower's debt coverage ratio financial statement, at which time the
0.
exceeds the lender's guidelines. City processes the request.
1
o
Repayment to the City begins after the • The interest rate cannot exceed prime
entire bank loan has been paid off, or plus 2 percent.
5
after the deferment period ends. • Bank loans range from two to ten years.
o whichever comes first. If the lender's terms exceed ten years.
• Interest does not accrue on the City loan the City's loan comes due in year ten.
until repayments begin; at that point, the • The bank loan must cover at least 80
market interest rate is charged. percent of the total project cost. The
However, if borrowers fail to provide typical bank loan is four times the
information as required in the loan amount of the City loan.
agreement, a market interest rate may
be charged during the deferment period. Th is structure is an innovative means of
• City loans are structured so that when fostering business development among
repayments begin, the monthly payment entrepreneurs who otherwise would not be able to
equals the monthly payment on the bank finance their businesses. By subordinating its lien
loan. As such, the term of the City loan position to private lenders, the City assumes a high
varies. degree of risk. If the program is successful, all
• Lifetime limits on City loans are City money will be repaid, and banks gain a greater
$ 100.000 for non-manufacturing understanding of inner-city areas, a heightened
businesses and $ 150.000 for interest in lending to these neighborhoods, and more
manufacturing businesses. extensive contact with inner-city entrepreneurs.
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Loan Process
Originally, when each participating bank
committed money to the loan program, the City
would allocate $1 for each $4 committed by the
bank. These funds were then available to each
bank separately. This system soon became
cumbersome, as some banks used their allocated
funds quickly while funds reserved for other banks
were left untouched and funds could not be easily
moved. Today, the program has been streamlined
to increase efficiency: the City has established one
program fund from which it lends. The City has
budgeted approximately $ 1 million annually for the
loan program, which comes from its general fund.
The first steps are key to the loan process.
Applicants first approach a participating lender to
apply for a loan. Often, the City has referred
applicants to a particular lending institution. The
lender, using standard underwriting criteria,
determines if the applicant is a candidate for the
program. According to lenders from two banks
active with the program, it is often the geographic
location of the business which triggers the lender's
decision to consider the CWAC program. 15 If the
applicant meets all of the bank's underwriting
criteria except for the required equity, the bank
requests funds from the City, which verifies the
applicant's eligibility. If all eligibility guidelines are
met and no other source of equity is available, the
application will most likely be approved. Once
approved, the loan closing process begins, both with
the City and the bank. After closing. City and bank
funds are disbursed and bank repayments begin.
The process is relatively straightforward and
requires little paperwork on the part of the borrower
or the lender. When asked about the program,
both lenders agreed that the process was easy, and
one commented immediately that the process is
especially simple compared to the complexity of
the SBA's 7a and 504 loan programs.
Eligibility Requirements and Recent
Changes
In order to successfully target the equity loan
program, the City of Charlotte has instituted
eligibility requirements, dictating where businesses
can be located, what types of businesses are
allowed, and business owners' maximum net worth.
Over time, these requirements have changed,
according to the needs and performance of the
program.
The geographic boundaries and net worth cap
are crucial components of the program's ability to
reach its target population. For a program with
intentions of spurring inner-city development,
limiting eligible businesses to designated areas is
obviously an important requirement. Also, because
net worth is a more effective measure of wealth
than income (as discussed in Section I), a net worth
cap will ensure that targeted low-wealth
entrepreneurs can make use of this program.
In addition to revisions in the eligibility
requirements, the City Council also approved
changes to the loan terms in January 200 1 . These
changes are:
• Increasing the maximum bank interest
rate from prime plus 1 percent to prime
plus 2 percent.
• Reducing the maximum deferral period
from ten years to five years, with the
option to renew up to five additional
years based on the lender's request (for
non-SBA participating loans only
)
• Permitting City loans to convert from
zero percent interest during the deferral
period to a market interest rate when the
borrower fails to provide information
required under the loan agreement.
These changes reflect three major issues:
changes in the lending climate, problems with the
program's original structure, and the politics
involved with the program. First, in terms of lending
climate, the recent drop in prime interest rates has
meant lower profits for lenders; increasing the
minimum bank loan interest rate from prime plus
one percent to prime plus two percent increases
the profit for banks. The City does not anticipate
that this will significantly affect loan volume or
performance. Second, in terms of program
structure, the program manager stated that most
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lenders required loan reviews after five years, even
for loans with 10- to 15-year terms. During these
reviews, it was clear that many of the businesses
had been very successful, and could afford after
five years to pay off both their bank and City loans.
However, with the deferred interest on the City
loan, there was little incentive to do this. The
reduction in the deferral period addresses this
conflict.
guidelines were changed to require that businesses
be located in targeted business districts. The
expansion of the eligible boundaries to include the
Eastside Strategy Plan, the Local Investment Zone,
and Morehead Street reflect changing priorities of
the City. The CWAC loan program's ability to adapt
to other City goals is an important component of


















Third, the program's job creation requirements
have caused problems from the beginning. In one
interview, a borrower complained that the job
creation requirement was the most limiting and
challenging part of the program. Over the course
of one year, this borrower hired thirty different
workers, and finally decided to hire her mother to
help in her seafood market. 16 Struggling to retain
staff, she felt pressured by the program's job
creation requirement. From the City's perspective,
getting the borrowers to annually report job creation
data has been equally frustrating. Recognizing that
there was no penalty for failing to report job
creation data to the City, and therefore little
incentive for borrowers to do so. the City added a
provision to the program enabling it to charge a
market interest rate during the deferment period
as a penalty. It should be noted, however, that the
City recognizes the frustrations of the business
owners. According to the program manager, "It is
not a question of actual performance as long as
the borrower demonstrates a good faith effort to
comply with the job creation requirement. We
recognize that business conditions sometimes
necessitate changes that will affect earlier
projections to create jobs.""
Fourth, the changes to the program's
geographic focus also reflect problems with the
original structure, as well as an expansion of the
City's geographic target areas. Originally, the loan
program required only that the business hired
residents of the CWAC area, but did not require
the business to be located within the CWAC
boundaries. However, from the beginning it was
evident that this requirement was not aligned with
the City's other neighborhood and commercial
revitalization programs designed to encourage
reinvestment in CWAC. Therefore, in 1998 the
The CWAC Equity Loan Program:
Analysis
A rigorous evaluation of the Charlotte program
is beyond the scope of this paper for two reasons.
First, the loan program does not work in isolation.
The CWAC loan program is part of the City's larger
CWAC initiative, so targeted neighborhoods have
received many types of development, infrastructure
and safety improvements, education and job
training, and other assistance. Also, the CWAC
loan program is only one of many small business
loan programs available to entrepreneurs in the
Charlotte area. Multiple causality therefore limits
the possibility of isolating the equity loan program's
effects.
Second, there is no control group to which the
affected neighborhoods and businesses can be
compared. Without this, it is difficult to attribute
any changes in the targeted areas to the loan
program. The UNC-Charlotte Urban Institute's
Quality of Life Study may help in this regard. It
may be possible to track changes in the status of
the neighborhoods where equity loan borrowers
are located - for example, to monitor how many
neighborhoods change from threatened to stable
over time. Subsequent regression analysis might
suggest a causal link between equity procurement
and neighborhood improvement.
Despite these two factors, an informal
analysis of the CWAC loan program can be
performed. In this section. I assess the
program's performance to date (outcome
analysis) and activity level to achieve its goals
(process analysis). I also discuss the qualitative




The CWAC loan program's performance can
be assessed based on the following indicators:
number, size, and status of loans; types of
businesses served, number of jobs created; and
extent of geographic targeting. Across most of
these indicators, the program ranks high and
appears to be successful.
Loan Size and Volume
Despite some fluctuation, the CWAC program
has demonstrated excellent loan volume over its
eight-year history. From 1992 to 2000, the program
made 123 loans. Table 3 summarizes the size of
these loans. Over the course of the program, the
smallest deal was $12,000 (an exception to the
$15,000 minimum deal size rule) and the largest
was $970,000.
The program averages 1 4 loans per year. In
1993, 1994 and 1996, the program averaged 16
loans; it made fewer loans in 1995 as the program
underwent structural changes, imposed a
moratorium, and revised its marketing strategy. In
1997, 1 1 loans were made, and the following year
the program made 25 loans, the largest amount in
any one year. In 1999 and 2000, the program made
nine loans (see Figure 1 ). In the first four months
of 2001, the program has approved nine loans
totaling $400,000, putting the program on track to
reach its goal of $ 1 million for the year.
In the program's first year, it made only four
loans, totaling $223,500. These loans were made
over a five-month period, and represent a
reasonable loan volume for a new program.
However, the program was criticized for approving
only four loans because it had over 1 ,600 inquiries
during that first year (the number of loan denials is
unknown). 31* Even more significant, however, is
the way in which the program was marketed. Low
approval levels suggest either overly stringent
underwriting guidelines or an unqualified applicant
pool; in Charlotte's case, the first-year applicants
were for the most part unqualified and ineligible
for the program. Without appropriate targeting and
marketing, the lure of the zero percent interest,
ten-year deferred loan attracted an overly
optimistic and misinformed applicant pool. The
Charlotte Observer reported the program's low
approval rate, and the program got off to a rocky
start.
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After this initial trouble, however, and after
working with lenders to more accurately market
the program, loan volume picked up. In its nine
years, the program has averaged over 14 loans
per year, enough to justify replenishing the City's
fund annually with $1 million. The program's
progress since 1996 has been promising, with at
least nine loans per year.
Loan Status
Over half of the CWAC loans are still current.
As Table 4 shows, 71 percent of City loans have
not yet been repaid, mostly because of the
deferment period. Because the majority of loans
have not yet reached the end of their five- or ten-
year deferral periods, the question remains as to
how successfully the program will recover its loans
in the future.
Eleven loans in this program have been written
off. According to the program manager, these
businesses failed to pay not because of program
characteristics, but because of personal reasons,
poor management, or market factors. A local
private gym. for example, could not compete with
larger gyms in the area; the owner of a lighting
company suffered from health problems; and a






















Figure 1. CWAC Equity Loan Volume 1992-2000
transportation company failed to renew its
contracts with other service providers. These
written-off loans, and the loans with assets under
review, account for only six percent of the City's
loan funds. While higher than conventional lending
programs, this rate is not surprising given the risky
nature of the program. Also, this six percent
represents a 0.75 percent per year default rate,
which is just slightly higherthan the industry average
(0.5 percent per year).
Businesses Served
Ninety percent of the program's loans have
gone to service and retail businesses, despite its
provisions allowing larger loans for manufacturing
businesses. Day care centers, restaurants, and
hairstyle salons have received the most loans,
followed by grocery and general retail stores. Other
types of businesses include automotive services,
dry cleaning, office supply and professional
services, manufacturing, and recycling. This mix
of businesses is encouraging, as there is an
inadequate variety of goods and services in many
of Charlotte's neighborhoods. From the New
Markets and IOC studies discussed in Section I, it
is clear that inner cities nationwide could benefit
from a program enabling this extent of retail and
service provision. However, manufacturing and
industrial jobs are often needed to spur intense
economic revitalization of an area (through higher
wages and the multiplier effect). To the extent
that the CWAC program aims to provide needed
goods and services, then, it accomplishes its goal.
And by providing local, small-scale retail businesses.
Status Number (Percent) City Funds Percent of
ofLoans City Funds
Current 87(71%) S3.359.881 83'.-;
Paid Off 21 (17%) $424543 11%
Written Off 1 1 (9%) $204,985 5%
Assets in Review 4 (3%) $55,570 1%
Total 123(100%) $4,044,979 100%
Table 4: Status of Citx Loans
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it lessens dislocation pressures. The drawback is
that the job potential of the neighborhood may be
limited.
The CWAC program makes loans to both new
and existing companies. While the breakdown of
loans to new versus existing companies for the
entire CWAC program is not readily available, an
analysis of 22 Self-Help loans reveals that nine
loans went to start-ups, ten went to existing
companies, and three were used for the acquisition
of other businesses. The program's commitment
to new businesses, at least as far as the Self-Help
analysis indicates, is promising. Business start-up
is especially difficult without personal equity, and it
appears that the program has helped entrepreneurs
overcome this barrier. Tracking the number of start-
ups for the whole portfolio would be beneficial.
An informal review of the CWAC loan portfolio
reveals that two-thirds of all loans have gone to
African-American borrowers; 17 percent to white
borrowers, and seven percent to Asians, Hispanics,
and others.40 Approximately 40 percent of all loans
went to women. Among Self-Help loans, the
numbers are similar: 82 percent of loans went to
minority-owned businesses and 55 percent to
women-owned businesses. 41 (According to the
2000 census, 58.3 percent of the City of Charlotte's
population is white.) The program's high
percentage of loans to minorities and women
suggests that it has succeeded in enabling both the
City of Charlotte and area lenders to meet their
mission of increasing loans to those borrowers.
Compared to the SBA's 503 and 504 loan
programs, it appears that the CWAC loan program
has performed relatively well in terms of job
creation. According to one study of Certified
Development Companies receiving SBA 503 and
504 loans, the programs created an average of one
job per $8,900 in guaranteed debentures. While
this exceeds the SBA's requirement of one job per
$35,000, it is lower than the CWAC program's
performance level. On the other hand, the study
acknowledges that all but one of the surveyed
companies did not fully comply with reporting
requirements, a problem that many CWAC
borrowers also experienced (see below).43 In sum,
the CWAC program's job creation performance
on average may exceed the required levels, but it
is likely that many of the businesses are unable to
sustain the required one job per $10,000 in equity
loans.
Geographic Targeting and Neighborhood
Development
A preliminary analysis of business location and
anecdotal evidence from borrowers suggest that
the program has been effective at stimulating
business activity and community involvement in
some neighborhoods, especially where clusters of
businesses congregate. Figure 2 shows macro and
micro patterns: while businesses receiving CWAC
equity loans are dispersed throughout the City
Within A City area, some groups of businesses are
found in tight clusters.
Job Creation
Job creation is one of the four major goals of
the CWAC loan program. According to the 2000
Job Creation Survey conducted by the City of
Charlotte, 66 surveyed businesses created 604 jobs
since closing their CWAC equity loans. These
businesses received a total of $2,652,097 in City
loans, yielding an average of one job for every
$4,390. This exceeds the goal of one job per
$ 10,000 of borrowed funds. Twenty-five of the 66
businesses (4 1 percent) exceeded theirjob creation
requirements. 42
The size of the CWAC area (60 square miles)
does not encourage intense clustering of
revitalization activity, although it does not preclude
it. How the program is marketed within the vast
territory is the key variable. The large area can
help build wider political support for the program,
although marshalling that support may require
considerable effort. This trade-off between
geographic/population coverage and focused
growth is one that must be carefully weighed. The
equity loan program was a natural fit with
Charlotte's largerCWAC initiative, so its large target
area is logical. Charlotte's size and population
density also warrant a large target area: 60 square
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miles may be necessary to capture the average of
14 loans made every year. However, spreading
loans all over town decreases the potential for
creating intense revitalization in any one area. Other
cities would be well advised to consider this question
of scale when replicating the program, and to align
their equity loan programs with other development
initiatives throughout the city. Smaller cities should
consider denser target areas, but should recognize
that a minimum geographic area is probably
necessary to capture a large enough eligible
applicant pool.
Process Analysis
McDonald, already a successful businessman, did
not need the interest-free City loan (the program
had no net worth cap at the time). Black leaders
responded with charges of racism, and a debate
ensued over the purpose of the program, how to
determine a reasonable public purpose for use of
City funds, and how to determine who needs the
City financing. Members of the City Council
defended their votes, insisting that McDonald could
afford traditional financing and citing Fun City's
cost overruns as reasons to reject the application.44
This debate received significant media coverage,
















The CWAC program can also be analyzed
based on how well its design allows it to achieve
its goals or to meet its mission. The program's
greatest strength in this area is its administrative
smoothness and simplicity: borrowers and lenders
have been pleased with the ease of working with
program staff and paperwork, and have praised
the program's management capabilities. Five
additional features of the program's structure have
been less effective, and limit the program's ability
to accomplish its goals: the loan approval process,
bank participation, job creation reporting, repayment
methods, and monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms.
Loan Approval Process
The loan approval process for the CWAC
Equity Loan Program is relatively straightforward,
but at times becomes hindered by politics. As
required by law, City loans exceeding $100,000
require City Council approval. To date, this
requirement has affected five percent of CWAC
program loans, and has at times made the process
unnecessarily political and bureaucratic. The story
of the Fun City Amusement Park exemplifies the
problems of Charlotte's original loan approval
process. John McDonald, the amusement park's
major investor, requested a $142,800 City loan
through the CWAC program in 1992. After
approval by NationsBank, the City Council rejected
the loan with a 5-6 vote along party lines.
Republicans opposed the loan, claiming that
This particular problem would not happen today
in Charlotte due to programmatic and political
changes. However, any loan requiring approval
by an elected body may prove to be politically
contentious. While the Charlotte program will not
avoid this problem under current North Carolina
law, any city replicating this model should ensure
that City Councils do not turn into de facto loan
credit committees.
Bank Participation
Bank participation, while strong and
widespread since the program's inception, has been
inconsistent over time. Twenty banks have
participated in the program since 1992. Originally,
eight banks pledged a total of $6.5 million in loan
funds. Some of these original banks have remained
active in the program, and bank participation in
general has varied over time. Four lenders - Self-
Help Credit Union. NationsBank/Bank ofAmerica
Centura and First Citizens - have made over half
of the loans. Although less active recently. Self-
Help has made the highest number of loans (28).
twice as many as any other lender.
Consistent bank participation and positive
relationships with lenders are important factors for
the program's success. According to the program
manager, high turnover among bank staff in
Charlotte and inconsistent bank participation over
time have made it difficult to ensure proper
marketing and use of the program. Because the
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program partly relies on the banks to recognize
eligible applicants and forward applications to the
City, loan volume is dependent on active bank
involvement. Lenders must be committed to
understanding how the program works, and remain
informed of any programmatic changes. At the
same time, program staff must do their part to
facilitate working relationships with bankers. A
Credit Officer of Scottish Bank, for example,
attested to this need. He praised the CWAC
program manager for his ability to effectively
communicate the program's goals and needs to
bankers, and for maintaining working relationships
with the borrowers. This has been key to Scottish
Bank's success with the program, the banker said.
Creating Jobs
The City's Job Creation Survey indicated that
66 businesses created 604 jobs. While this
performance level is good, as discussed above, the
program has experienced problems with its job
creation and reporting processes. First, program
staff have had difficulty compelling borrowers to
report job creation information. Borrowers receive
letters requesting job information in the first quarter
of every year. Follow-up phone calls and additional
letters are often required, but eventually the City
receives the requested information from 90 to 100
percent of the businesses. 45 To encourage
borrowers to provide this information, the program
decided to charge a market interest rate during,the
loan deferment period in cases where businesses
fail to report job creation (and other) data.
Second, the program requires that employees
of businesses receiving loans must be low- or
moderate-income residents of the CWAC area.
This information is difficult to track and verify. It
also limits the number of potential employees, and
causes problems when employees move from
within the CWAC area to another location.
Another problem is that borrowers have had
difficulty retaining qualified staff. One borrower
was particularly frustrated with the lack of
assistance available to her for finding and retaining
staff; she recommended that the City provide a
follow-up program, or something in addition to the
services of the state Employment office. The City
maintains that it refers borrowers to the JobLink
Center, neighborhood and business associations, or
other small business assistance centers as needed,
and in general provides whatever assistance it can
to help business owners retain jobs.
Because of the difficulty involved with the
accurate reporting ofjob creation, and because job
creation is seen as a low priority goal. Self-Help
has omitted a job creation requirement from its
proposed equity loan program. This is a prudent
idea; job creation is a natural result of business
formation, but businesses should not be hindered
by bureaucratic reporting requirements. On the
other hand, job creation is crucial to neighborhood
and economic development, and information on the
number of jobs and residence of employees is
essential for program monitoring and evaluation.
Furthermore, the City of Charlotte contends that
its annual job survey allows program staff to stay
in touch with borrowers, to assist them with hiring,
to "learn about other issues the business owner
may be facing," and to update information in the
program's database.46 This contact is an invaluable
part of the program's ability to monitor its
borrowers. However, an annual business review
- instead of job reporting - would be an equally
effective means of fostering these relationships and
obtaining necessary information without causing
the problems associated with job creation
requirements. As the Charlotte experience has
shown, it would also be necessary to institute some
level of penalty for businesses failing to participate
in the review.
Repayment Methods
As the program is currently structured, loan
repayments return to the City's Development &
Revitalization Fund (DARF) and as such, the funds
may be used for other neighborhood and
commercial revitalization activities. While this
funding structure allows the City maximum
flexibility, it does not establish a revolving source
of funds for the loan program. Accordingly, the
program is exclusively reliant on separate annual
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appropriations. To address this weakness, the Self-
Help replicated model proposes that the fund
revolve to the maximum extent possible,
recognizing that the deferred repayment structure
reduces the revolving nature of the fund. This will
decrease the need for additional capital infusions,
a feature which could be important in cities with
less consistent funding than Charlotte.
Monitoring and Evaluation
The CWAC loan program establishes very little
in the way of program monitoring and evaluation.
It does require that borrowers send annual reports
to the City, including such information as the
number of jobs created. However, as discussed
above, the City has no way to enforce these
regulations, and (until recently) has had no means
of penalizing non-compliance. Furthermore, the
program has no formal mechanism for evaluating
or monitoring its own progress; staff periodically
review their progress and determine if changes
need to be made. The 1998 and 2001
programmatic changes resulted from staff
recognizing deficiencies in the program, and
bringing them to the City Council for revision.
The program's success to date warrants a more
formal monitoring and evaluation system. The first
step that must be taken is to establish standards by
which to measure the program's progress, and to
set more measurable goals and objectives for the
future. The only current quantifiable goals,
according to the program manager, are 20 loans or
$ 1 million in loans per year, and one job per $ 10,000
of City loans. It has no goals for gender or race of
borrowers, type or location of businesses, or bank
participation rates. The program would benefit
from setting additional goals, by which it would be
able to monitor its impact and progress more
effectively. An independent evaluation, perhaps
tied to an overall CWAC study, could also be helpful.
Impact Analysis
The third level of analysis involves determining
the impact of CWAC businesses on their
neighborhoods. Interviews with two borrowers
provide preliminary insights into this topic. One
borrower, Rita Rondina, used her CWAC equity
loan to relocate her silk flower manufacturing
business to a larger facility on Charlotte's west
side. The building is located across the street from
a public housing development, and further down
the street is a new strip shopping center with a day
care center. The business. Florita Nova, is also
located on public bus routes, and is within walking
distance of many residences.
Physically, economically, and socially, this
business has made a positive impact on its
neighborhood. The building, a former
pharmaceutical factory, has been cleaned up, with
new windows added on the street level.
Landscaping and the addition of a large garden on
the side of the building greatly enhance the
streetscape. In addition, Rondina makes a
conscious effort to attract and retain employees
who live in the neighborhood. She has succeeded
with this in part because of the building's
accessibility by bus and foot; many of her
employees do not have cars. In addition, the
business offers English lessons and day care
benefits. Rondina has also formed a relationship
with a church next to the business. Florita Nova
therefore provides quality jobs and important social
services to many of the neighborhood's residents.
As a result of the building's improvements and
the company's dedication to its physical
surroundings, there has been less crime on the
formerly vacant street, according to Rondina.
Although the 2000 Quality of Life Study ranked
the neighborhood as Fragile, improvements to the
public housing buildings across the street and the
construction of the new shopping area a few blocks
away indicate the beginnings of neighborhood
change. 47 While this change is not due entirely to
CWAC Equity Loan Program, the business it helped
to expand certainly has played a key role.
Nonetheless, the impact of the loan program and
the relocated business is small; the neighborhood
can still benefit from economic and physical
improvements beyond the scope of the CWAC
program.
The West End Seafood Market is also an
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integral part of a revitalizing business district less
than three miles north of downtown Charlotte. The
market's owner, Bernetta Powell, obtained a
CWAC equity loan to start her business in a building
formerly occupied by a drug store/restaurant. The
building closed in the 1980s and remained vacant,
attracting drugs, graffiti and other crime. The City
designated the neighborhood as a distressed area,
and included it in the CWAC initiative. In 2000.
the neighborhood received a Fragile ranking from
the Quality of Life Study.48
Today, Powell claims her business is having a
positive impact on the neighborhood. By providing
jobs and a service, the business adds value to the
community. Powell also rents out the remaining
space in her building to office and retail businesses.
Other formerly vacant buildings in the neighborhood
have recently reopened. The City has also invested
in the area, putting $900,000 into a shopping center
located directly across the street from the market,
and making over $2 million in infrastructure
improvements along Beatties Ford Road. The
loan program is therefore an integral part of the
City's comprehensive business corridor
revitalization program.
While both Florita Nova and the West End
Seafood Market have positively contributed to their
neighborhoods, the extent of redevelopment activity
that is possible as a result of the CWAC loan
program is limited. For example, Charlotte's
physical form will prevent many of its neighborhoods
from achieving the new urbanism principles of
revitalization. Wide streets with little connectivity
and lack of pedestrian-friendly features, for
example, characterize Tryon Street and Beatties
Ford Road where Florita Nova and the seafood
market are located. These neighborhoods are not
the vibrant, walkable communities envisioned by
new urbanists or the City's Neighborhood
Development Department. Physical and design
improvements are needed, which emphasizes how
important it is that the CWAC loan program be
part of a multi-faceted approach to neighborhood
revitalization.
Finally, another significant potential impact of
the CWAC loan program is dislocation of residents.
As with any program that redevelops an area and
raises building and land values, there exists the
possibility that current, low-wealth residents will
not be able to afford to remain in the area. This
threat is palpable in many areas with CWAC
businesses. However, the program makes a
conscious effort to avoid this by loaning only to
low-wealth borrowers, limiting the size of its loans,
and requiring that employees who meet the job
creation requirements reside within the CWAC
area. Therefore, while it is unlikely that the CWAC
program alone will cause dislocation of many local
residents and businesses, it is important to recognize
that the greater redevelopment effort of which it is
a part may do so.
Summary
The CWAC Equity Loan Program has been
an integral part of Charlotte's neighborhood
development efforts since 1992. It has given over
100 borrowers equity loans to start or expand their
businesses throughout the CWAC area, which in
turn have provided needed goods and services to
Charlotte's residents, created jobs, and to a small
extent helped revitalize communities. From 1992
to 2000. the program performed quite well. A high
percentage of loans went to women and minorities
for retail and service businesses. The program's
average 14 loans per year were sufficient to give
it continued financial and political support. Though
most of the loans are still current and the City's
ability to recoup its loan funds is still unknown,
repayments so far suggest promising trends for the
future.
The structure of the program, while
unproblematic for the most part, has imposed some
limits on the program's effectiveness. The loan
approval process has the potential to make the
program unnecessarily political, job creation
requirements are difficult to document and enforce,
the loan repayment structure makes the program
overly dependent on annual City appropriations, and
the program lacks a formal monitoring and
evaluation system.
On the other hand, widespread bank

















bankers have helped the program succeed.
Importantly, the high quality of the program's
internal management and the straightforward
process for borrowers and lenders to use the
program have significantly contributed to its
effectiveness. While the CWAC loan program
could benefit from some structural changes, its
performance to date is encouraging. For this
reason, Self-Help believes the program can also
successfully help entrepreneurs in other North
Carolina cities obtain access to equity capital. I
now turn to Self-Help's replication effort and my
recommendations for bringing the program to other
cities.
///. Replication
Self-Help has been actively pursuing the
replication of the CWAC Equity Loan Program
since September 1999. Recognizing the potential
for the program to stimulate redevelopment in North
Carolina's cities, and the potential to increase its
own loan volume, Self-Help staff surveyed its
CWAC loan activity in Charlotte, met with Charlotte
program staff, and began to consider replicating
the program around the state. Using its branch
offices in Asheville, Greensboro, Greenville, and
Wilmington as guides, Self-Help identified the cities
with the most need and the most potential for
success. Today, the effort is focused on
Greensboro, where plans for a pilot program are
underway.
The proposed Greensboro program eliminates
the City as manager of the loan fund, but keeps
City staff closely involved with program design,
geographic targeting, and other programmatic
decisions. In place of the City, an independent or
quasi-public agency would serve as the loan fund
manager, with a steering committee to design and
supervise the program.
In this model, Self-Help would be in a unique
position to serve as a participating lender, a
member of the steering committee, and as the
loan servicing and closing agency. This
arrangement may involve a conflict of interest
for Self-Help, and could potentially put other
banks at a disadvantage. To ensure that all
lenders have an equal opportunity to make loans,
a referral system would be established whereby
applicants would be referred equally to Self-Help
and other participating lenders.
The Self-Help replication effort serves as a
guide for others seeking to adopt the Charlotte
program. Replication depends on good timing,
community interest, availability of partners and
funding, and political support. Even with a good
model, Self-Help's experience shows that
replication efforts will confront hurdles. In the
sections that follow, I discuss the four primary
steps Self-Help took when considering the
program - surveying potential cities, identifying
key players, developing a budget, and modifying
the program's structure - and offer
recommendations for keys to a successful equity
loan program.
Surveying Potential Cities
One of the first crucial steps Self-Help took to
begin the process of replicating the CWAC
program was to identify cities where the program
would likely be successful. By nature, the program
will be different wherever it is implemented, so it
is important to identify the location before finalizing
the program's details. The criteria for an
appropriate city, determined largely though Self-
Help's experience in Charlotte and its lending and
policy experience in general, include (1) demand
for the program, (2) a political culture open to the
idea of the program, and (3) a network of
organizations - including Self-Help staff,
community and economic developers, local
government staff, and non-profits - with the
capacity and desire to initiate the program. For
Self-Help, the logical places to start were North
Carolina's largest cities, where Self-Help has
branch locations: Asheville. Greensboro, Raleigh,
Durham, Fayetteville, and Wilmington.
(Northeastern North Carolina has also been
considered for a rural version of the program.)
Visits to these cities and conversations with
the key players revealed that Greensboro was the
most feasible place to seriously consider the
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program. The findings in other cities show how
important it is that all three location criteria be met.
In Asheville, the community is focused on the need
for affordable housing rather than the need for
additional small business lending tools. In
Wilmington, while the need exists and a variety of
organizations were enthusiastic about the program
and identified potential funds, the City's community
development department was in the process of
hiring a new executive director and therefore
lacked the capacity to help plan and implement the
program. Finally, Raleigh, Durham, and Fayetteville
(together served by one Self-Help branch) each
show a need for access to equity capital and the
potential for adequate staff and resources, but may
be more politically reluctant to accept such a
program. Despite these obstacles, these cities
should be explored further as possible locations for
the program. Currently, Self-Help is focusing its
efforts on Greensboro, where conversations with
the key players indicated that the timing was right
for pursuing the program there.
After identifying the city, Self-Help's next step
was to establish preliminary geographic boundaries,
based on poverty, income and other relevant
demographic data. In Greensboro, for example,
Self-Help mapped the census tracts with poverty
rates below 20 percent. These tracts, forming a
crescent extending northeast and west from
downtown, formed the initial basis for the target
area. Other sources that can help identify target
areas include state or local development zones.
Enterprise Communities or Empowerment Zones,
or other geographically defined programs such as
Charlotte's City WithinA City initiative. Once these
preliminary areas have been defined, the
boundaries can be finalized through negotiations
with key stakeholders, taking into account the
available funds, technical capacity, and political
needs.
Identifying Key Players
In conjunction with determining the city and
the target area, Self-Help identified the necessary
players to be involved with designing, funding, and
managing the program. In general, the key players
are:
• City staff, likely from the planning,
community development or economic
development departments;
• Community development corporations
(CDCs), non-profit organizations, and
foundations;
• Chambers of Commerce;
• Local lenders; and/or
• Small business technical assistance
providers
After contacting these entities, Self-Help
began to determine the roles and responsibilities
for each. In Greensboro, the proposed equity loan
fund involves six key players, each with separate
tasks. The first, a steering committee, is an informal
group similar to an advisory board, and includes
members from multiple organizations (banks. City
government, non-profit organizations, and Self-
Help). The second, a Business Services
Representative, is responsible for the program's
administrative tasks and would most likely be a
staff member of the third organization, the loan
pool fiscal agent. This agent is an independent
organization such as the Chamber of Commerce
or other local economic development entity. Fourth,
technical assistance (TA) providers are needed to
help entrepreneurs write business plans and
complete loan applications. TA providers can be
entities such as North Carolina's Small Business
Technology and Development Center, a small
business incubator, local planning departments, or
the Chamber of Commerce. The fifth key player
is a loan closing and servicing agency. Finally,
participating banks are obviously a crucial
component of the program. Below are the
recommended tasks for each player.
1 . Steering Committee
• Assigns and monitors roles
• Drafts written guidelines for loan fund
use (e.g., minimum loan amount, net
worth requirements, etc.)
• Approves or denies Bank request for
program funding
• Has authority to set or change policy
• Acquires funds
• Oversees capital and operating budget










































• Ensures involvement/representation of
necessary stakeholders, including low-
wealth advocates
• Sets appropriate expectation for loan
volume
• Coordinates with entrepreneurial training
and real estate development
• Conducts and/or supervises outreach
2. Business Services Representative
• Reviews eligibility checklist
• Coordinates with/participates in bank
interactions
• Manages borrower reporting
requirements
3. Loan Pool Fiscal Agent
• Maintains loan pool account
• Authorizes loan pool transactions
• Is signatory on loan documents
4. TA Providers/Small Business Assistance
Centers
• Provide TA to borrower during loan
process and after closing
5. Loan Closing and Servicing Agency (can
also serve as a participating bank)
Closes, services, and records loans
Prepares program commitment letter
Participating Banks
Promote program availability internally
Use standard underwriting criteria when
considering borrowers
Coordinate with Business Services
Representative
Provide data for program evaluation
Assist with outreach, where applicable
Developing a Budget
The next step in establishing the program is to
create a preliminary budget and identify funding
sources. Using Charlotte's program as a guide,
Self-Help created a ten-year capital and operating
budget for the Greensboro program, assuming it
would make three to four loans per year. The
capital budget projected an average of $53,500 in
annual loans, and would require on average $43,500
per year in grants. These figures are based on the
assumption that half of the loans made in years
one through five will be repaid at a ten percent
annual interest rate beginning in year six. On the
operating budget side. Self-Help estimates $300
per month in marketing and administrative costs,
$ 1 5 per month in servicing costs for each loan, and
a one-time $250 expense for the approval and
disbursement of each loan. Operating revenues
would come from a one percent origination fee on
each loan, and periodic operating grants.
Once the budget needs are known, the next
step is to identify funding sources. Potential
sources of funds include the City, the Chamber of
Commerce, foundations, government entities, and
banks. In Charlotte, the CWAC program was
originally funded with a former Urban
Development Action Grant. In Greensboro, Self-
Help is considering financial support from the City,
a local foundation, a CDC, and banks. City funding
gives the program political support and helps
promote the program's mission of revitalizing the
city's neighborhoods. However, it is often subject
to additional laws such as North Carolina's
requirement that City loan money be approved by
the City Council. Foundation and CDC funds are
usually more flexible, and for this program are an
appropriate means of targeting money to specific
neighborhoods in order to help meet the
organizations' missions. Bank funding will in most
cases be pledged primarily as a means for the banks
to fulfill their CRA requirements, as discussed in
Section I of this report. An important question
regarding this funding source is whether to require
banks to contribute money in order to make loans
through the program. Where funding is inadequate,
or where competition for program participation is
high, this requirement would likely be beneficial.
Modifying the Program's Structure
The fourth critical step in establishing the
program is to modify the CWAC structure to meet
the needs and conditions of the new city. Each
new location must tailor the basic loan terms,
eligibility criteria, and policy guidelines to fit its
needs. Before finalizing the details, the program's
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designers can decide the basic terms, such as loan
deferral period and maximum loan amount. For
example, the Greensboro model proposes a ten-
year deferral period, a $250,000 net worth cap,
and no job creation requirements. This preliminary
structure can be used as a marketing tool to gain
financial and political support for the program.
Eventually, the steering committee will resolve the
details of the program's structure with input from
other key players.
Another step in tailoring the program to the
needs of each city is to determine the relationship
between the key players and the process by which
funds will flow through the program. Both of these
factors will vary from city to city, depending on
local conditions. For example, program funds in
Charlotte flow from the City's general fund to the
program to the borrowers, and then return to the
general fund. The City runs the program, and
maintains relationships with banks and technical
assistance providers. The Greensboro model
proposes that loan repayments return directly to
the program loan pool, and establishes a non-City
steering committee to oversee the program. Without
tailoring the CWAC model to the lending
environment of each city, a replicated equity loan
program will not successfully meet the needs of its
entrepreneurs or the city as a whole.
Next Steps
After identifying the city, key players, funding
sources and determining the program's structure,
Self-Help's next steps to establishing the program
will be to convene the steering committee and
finalize the details of the program. After that, it
plans to obtain commitments from banks, market
the program and eventually begin making loans.
These general steps can also be taken by other
organizations seeking to develop a similar equity
loan program.
Recommendations
Self-Help's replication effort is one of many
ways to bring Charlotte's program to other North
Carolina cities. The steps it has taken and the
policies that have guided it are unique to Self-Help,
but they provide a basis for some general
recommendations for a successful equity loan fund.
To be successful, a replicated version of the CWAC
Equity Loan Program must adapt to the specific
circumstances of the city in which it is instituted
-
its political and institutional climate; any existing
programs; the availability of funding, physical space,
and infrastructure; its land use patterns; and the
economy. Therefore, depending on the timing,
location, and organization establishing the program,
each program will be different.
The following recommendations can be applied
to any city, but are based in large part on Self-
Help's experience in Charlotte and Greensboro.
They represent lessons learned over the course of
Self-Help's effort to redefine and recreate a
program it believes will effectively facilitate small
business development in distressed urban business
districts through the provision of equity capital.
Recommendations for Program Structure
and Administration
• Combine the loan program with
other eity-wide redevelopment
initiatives. An isolated business
development/loan program will not
improve the physical environment of a
neighborhood, the quality of available
retail services, or the chance for low-
wealth entrepreneurial activity.
• To avoid politicizing the loan
program, ensure that the loan
approval process does not require
approval of individual loans by
elected bodies. Charlotte's program
received negative media coverage in its
early days when the City Council,
subject to state law, was charged with
approving large loans. It is preferable
for an independent professional staff to
make loan decisions.
• Allow loan repayments to recycle
back into the equity pool. This will
help the program become more self-
sustaining.
• Set early expectations low. Do not
market the program as a way for any
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low-income individual to obtain a loan. • If possible, start with a small target
Emphasize that standard underwriting area. Spreading loans out all over town
criteria will still be used. will not foster synergy from clusters of
• Maintain positive working businesses. Targeting the program to a
relationships with lenders. The small, select area will emphasize the
program requires strong bank program's geographic focus. Incentives
participation, and relies on lenders to could be included to encourage loans to
identify potential borrowers. Lenders businesses located near existing program
must understand how the program borrowers or desired locations (business
works, recognize eligible applicants, and districts).
work closely and consistently with • Identify a minimum size target area.
program staff. While the target area should not be too
• Establish goals or benchmarks for large, it cannot be so small that the
program review and monitoring. It is program is unable to make enough loans.
important to get feedback from It also must be large enough to garner
borrowers, to conduct periodic sufficient political support. The program
independent reviews, and to perform must expand beyond downtown or the
process, outcome and impact area covered by one CDC.
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evaluations. • Support geographic boundary
§ decisions with census or other data.
-j Recommendations for Eligibility Politics and the interests of neighborhood
5 Requirements advocacy groups may influence the
program's target locations. To make a
»j
| • Job creation should be seen as a more objective decision, identify poverty.
2
benefit, but not a main goal, of the income, or other variables that
program. Job creation is hard to characterize the selected area.
document and verify, and setting goals
1 such as one job per $ 1 0,000 is probably NOTES
unrealistic. It is better to focus on the
1 other important goals of the program. 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
o such as improved access to wealth and (HUD), New Markets: The Untapped Retail Buying Power
5 business development.
• Require business owners to
in America's Inner Cities (July 1999).
participate in annual business
:
Initiative for a Competitive Inner City (ICIC) and
reviews, and institute a penalty for
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inner-City Business
Development: Benchmarking Federal Spending and
those who do not. Information Guidelines for Action (PricewaterhouseCoopers and ICIC,
gathered in annual reviews is key to May 1999): 10. Available <http://www.icic.org/research/
program and business monitoring; it is pdf/pdf_7_federal_spending.pdf>.
important to experiment to find the best
3 Glenn Yago, "Minority Businesses are Key to U.S.
method for conducting these reviews. Growth. They Need Better Funding Sources." Forbes
Be respectful of business owners' time. Magazine 29 November 1999. Available <http://
• Include net worth limit to effectively www.forbes.com/forbes/99/1129/6413036a.htm>.
target a low-wealth population. The
4 Tax Increment Financing. Web site. City of Chicago.
net worth cap is a more effective
Department of Planning and Development. 1998. <http://
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